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Greg Distelhorst, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Yue Hou, University of PennsylvaniaWhy do nondemocratic regimes provide constituency service? This study develops theory based on a national ﬁeld
audit of China’s “Mayor’s Mailbox,” an institution that allows citizens to contact local political ofﬁcials. Analyzing gov-
ernment responses to over 1,200 realistic appeals from putative citizens, we ﬁnd that local service institutions in China are
comparably responsive to similar institutions in democracies. Two key predictors of institutional quality are economic
modernization and the intensity of local social conﬂict. We explain these ﬁndings by proposing a demand-driven
theory of nondemocratic constituency service; in order to sustain the informational beneﬁts of citizen participation,
the responsiveness of service institutions must increase with citizen demand. We then offer supplementary evidence for
this theory by analyzing the content of real letters from citizens to local ofﬁcials in China.Constituency service—ofﬁcials’ efforts to solve prob-lems raised by citizens—is an important componentof political representation. Classic studies of con-
stituency service demonstrate how the incentives of electoral
politics motivate and shape ofﬁcials’ responsiveness to the
public (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fenno 1978). Yet
these studies offer little help in explaining the political logic
of constituency service in nondemocracies. This study de-
velops theory about the drivers of constituency service in a
nondemocratic regime, thereby shedding light on the logic
of political representation in the absence of electoral politics.
The rapidly growing literature on nondemocratic insti-
tutions (Blaydes 2010; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Hou
2015; Jensen, Malesky, and Weymouth 2014; Levitsky and
Way 2010; Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006; Malesky and
Schuler 2010; Truex 2016) has yet to address constituency
service institutions, but it is clear that the nondemocratic
logic must diverge from the democratic one. Democratic re-
sponsiveness to constituent requests turns on electoral rec-
iprocity: representatives believe that delivering constituency
service yields electoral payoffs (Cain et al. 1987), elected rep-
resentatives offer more assistance to citizens eligible to vote
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms constituency service is credited with driving the long-term
increase in incumbency advantage in the United States (Cain
et al. 1987; King 1991). If nondemocracies provide similar
forms of constituency service, a different theoretical frame-
work is required to explain this behavior in the absence of an
electoral link between ofﬁcials and the public.
Field studies of constituency service have a rich history
in democracies, spanning both advanced industrialized coun-
tries (Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Butler,
Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Carnes and Holbein 2015; Dropp
and Peskowitz 2012; Loewen and MacKenzie 2013; Putnam
1994; White, Nathan, and Faller 2015) and emerging econo-
mies (McClendon 2016; Spada and Guimarães 2013; Spada
et al. 2012). This study adopts a similar approach to studying
constituency service under nondemocratic rule. It uses a
national ﬁeld audit of service institutions in contemporary
China to develop theory on nondemocratic constituency
service. We analyze the behavior of local institutions in re-
sponse to 1,225 realistic service requests from putative cit-
izens, avoiding the potential biases of self-reported data from
government agencies or citizens. Like other studies con-
ducted in democratic contexts, examining ofﬁcial responses
to ﬁctitious constituent requests captures real, albeit small,ssor and an assistant professor of global economics and management a
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service to the public.
The audit reveals that this institution provides a sur-
prisingly high level of service. China’s mayors’ ofﬁces of-
fered helpful responses to 43% of appeals in the audit, mak-
ing these agencies more responsive to information requests
than the ofﬁces of elected representatives in several previous
studies of democracies. Examining variation across locali-
ties, we ﬁnd that quality of service is predicted not by tra-
ditional measures of state capacity or economic develop-
ment but rather by modernization of the economy—the
dominance of the industrial and service sectors—and
higher levels of local social unrest. These effects appear in
both traditional regression analyses and new machine learn-
ing approaches that mitigate concerns about misspeciﬁcation
bias.
We argue that this pattern—high responsiveness to pro-
saic citizen appeals and higher responsiveness in econom-
ically modernized localities—suggests a logic of nondem-
ocratic constituency service that goes beyond short-term
efforts to prevent collective action. Building on insights from
the political economy of nondemocratic regimes, we argue
that constituency service institutions deliver valuable in-
formation about society to nondemocratic states. However,
these informational beneﬁts depend on sustaining voluntary
public participation. If citizens lose faith in the institution
and become politically disengaged, the state loses access to
this information. The government therefore nurtures public
participation by providing constituency service of reason-
able quality and increasing service quality in response to
public demand.1 Finally, to illustrate how effective constit-
uency service institutions can generate information about
public service failures and social conﬂict, we analyze the
content of a sample of publicly available letters from citizens
to ofﬁcials in China.
This study introduces a new institution to the growing
body of scholarship on quasi-democratic practices in non-
democratic regimes, which to date has largely focused on
elections, parties, and legislatures.2 In keeping with this lit-
erature, we ﬁnd that authoritarian constituency service goes1. The idea that authoritarian regimes promote certain forms of mass
participation is not incompatible with the claim that authoritarian
incumbents seek to limit mass collective action. Certain forms of political
participation, such as the service requests we study, are relatively atomized
and unlikely to facilitate future collective action.
2. A notable exception to the focus on elections, parties, and
legislatures in nondemocracies has been the study of petitioning (xinfang)
institutions in China (Chen 2008, 2012; Luehrmann 2003; O’Brien and Li
1995). We build on this literature by studying citizen contacting in China
on a national scale.
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service. However, whereas some previous research on non-
democratic institutions ﬁnds that “parties do not compete
and legislatures do not legislate” (Gandhi 2008, 180), the
institution we study delivers a level of responsiveness to
informational appeals that is comparable to similar institu-
tions in democratic regimes. Although motivated by the
collection of information rather than electoral reciprocity,
constituency service in China appears to improve the quality
of local governance. The concluding section discusses the




In the last decade, a consensus has emerged that nondem-
ocratic institutions matter. Legislatures, political parties, and
elections are more than democratic façades in the political
economy of nondemocratic rule. Across a variety of regions
and regimes, these institutions serve to manage conﬂict and
competition among political elites (Blaydes 2010; Brownlee
2007; Gandhi 2008; Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006), elicit
cooperation from society (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006), co-
opt political opposition (Lust-Okar 2005; Magaloni 2006),
and generate information for the regime (Magaloni 2006;
Manion 2016; Truex 2016). These institutionsmatter not only
for the durability of nondemocratic regimes but also for their
institutions and provision of public goods (Gandhi 2008; Luo
et al. 2007; Wang and Yao 2007).
This inquiry into nondemocratic institutions has yet to
explore institutions of constituency service. Service insti-
tutions purport to render government ofﬁcials responsive
to the needs of citizens. Although a deﬁning feature of non-
democracies is the weakness or absence of electoral ac-
countability, these regimes provide institutions with the
apparent function of “providing help to individuals, groups,
and localities in coping with . . . government” (Fenno 1978,
101).3 Institutions for citizens to contact ofﬁcials are de-
scribed in studies of traditional communist regimes such as
the USSR (Little 1976) and Bulgaria (Dimitrov 2014b), as
well as contemporary single-party regimes such as Singa-
pore (Li et al. 2004) and prerevolutionary Egypt (Reddick,
Abdelsalam, and Elkadi 2011). In the subject of our study,
the People’s Republic of China, constituency service is one3. Fenno’s (1978) deﬁnition originally referred to the “federal gov-
ernment,” as his research subjects were US congresspeople. We see no
need for conceptually limiting constituency service to national-level
governments. The public’s need for help dealing with government is not
speciﬁc to any particular jurisdictional scale.
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4. Our audit found over 50 variants of online channels for contacting
city government, with names such as Government Mailbox, Ask-about-
Government Web, Mayor’s Hotline, Write to the Mayor, and Leaders’
Window. The most common name for this institution was Mayor’s
Mailbox (65%).
Volume 79 Number 3 July 2017 / 000of several “mass line” institutions that are purported to fa-
cilitate direct consultation between citizens and ofﬁcials
while maintaining concentration of power in the Commu-
nist Party (Chen 2012; Dickson 2016; Tang 2016). Scholar-
ship on these institutions has highlighted their role in fa-
cilitating extra-institutional resistance and strengthening
control over bureaucratic subordinates (Cai 2010; Chen
2008, 2012; Luehrmann 2003). We contribute to this re-
search by offering a national evaluation of institutional
quality and building theory on the drivers of constituency
service under nondemocratic rule.
What drives constituency service in the absence of
electoral incentives? We exploit subnational variation in
service quality across China to test three preliminary hy-
potheses. One logic of nondemocratic constituency service
views it as an issue of state capacity. Local governments are
given a variety of mandates from superiors, among them
ﬁelding and resolving appeals from citizens. The quality of
these institutions may therefore vary with government re-
sources available to staff service ofﬁces and efﬁciently pro-
cess citizen requests. Nondemocratic regimes exhibit wide
variation in coercive and implementation capacities both
across countries and subnationally (Bellin 2004; Levitsky
and Way 2010). If constituency service is primarily gov-
erned by a practical logic of policy implementation, local
variation in state capacity will be a strong predictor of the
quality of service.
Economic modernization may also help explain the
provision of constituency service in nondemocracies. Early
modernization theorists such as Lerner (1958) and Lipset
(1960) argued that economic change exerts a powerful in-
ﬂuence on state-society relations. They view increased ur-
banization, wealth, education, and communications as al-
tering the public’s expectations surrounding the role of
government, a relationship that has been elaborated through
subsequent survey research (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
Even when modernization does not lead to political democ-
racy, it transforms authoritarian states by creating “competing
interests, conﬂicting normative claims, and divergent behav-
ioral expectations” (O’Donnell 1973, 75–76). Modernization
is a syndrome of social and political changes, but the most
relevant to constituency service are the changes in public
expectations surrounding the role of government. The de-
velopment of the industrial welfare state increases govern-
ment involvement in economic life as both a regulator and a
provider of social beneﬁts such as health care and education.
As citizens’ interaction with government agencies intensiﬁes,
constituency service institutions are in greater demand to
resolve citizen problems and address sources of discontent
with policy. These demand pressures may incentivize in-This content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms vestment to improve nondemocratic constituency services.
This logic predicts improved service quality in settings of
greater economic modernization.
Finally, constituency service may be driven by the need
to manage social conﬂict. Public protest and other visible
breakdowns of public order represent a major political con-
cern for nondemocratic regimes and have attracted par-
ticular attention in contemporary China (King, Pan, and
Roberts 2013; Shirk 2008;Wallace 2014). Even protests for
ostensibly nationalist causes threaten to turn against the state
(Weiss 2014). This makes the management of social stability
a major concern for nondemocratic regimes, leading to
massive expenditures of ofﬁcial time and resources (Chen
2013; Wang 2014). Constituency service may contribute to
managing social conﬂict in two ways. First, citizen service
requests may seek intervention of political ofﬁcials into
their disputes with government agencies, employers, busi-
ness partners, and other economic actors. These appeals
offer an opportunity for service institutions to resolve these
grievances before they escalate to more disruptive forms of
claims making (Cai 2010; Chen 2012). Second, citizen ap-
peals for service can highlight areas of public policy that
contribute to citizen grievances more generally. This infor-
mation on unpopular or poorly implemented policies can be
used to make adjustments that reduce discontent. This logic
predicts that increased social instability will be associated
with improved provision of constituency service, as local
governments invest in better service institutions.DATA: FIELD AUDIT OF SERVICE INSTITUTIONS
We test these three hypotheses—bureaucratic capacity,
economic modernization, and social conﬂict—using data
collected from a multiple-wave ﬁeld audit of a local constit-
uency service institution in China. The institution we study
is commonly known as the “Mayor’s Mailbox” (shizhang xin-
xiang), a channel for citizens to contact local political leaders
with questions, complaints, or suggestions (Chen, Pan, and
Xu 2016; Distelhorst and Hou 2014; Hartford 2005).4 Citizens
submit their requests for assistance through government web-
pages or to e-mail addresses established for this purpose. This
institution appeared in the early 2000s as a result of a nation-
wide “Government Online” campaign initiated by the State
Economic and Trade Commission and more than 40 other01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
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Mailbox was available on the ofﬁcial webpages of 98% of
China’s 336 prefecture-level governments.
The Mayor’s Mailbox represents a technologically mod-
ern addition to the mass line institutions in China, such as
petitioning ofﬁces (Chen 2012; Luehrmann 2003). Similar
to citizen petitions, Mayor’s Mailbox complaints are typi-
cally received by a general-purpose ofﬁce and then routed
to the most relevant bureau, which then provides a re-
sponse to the citizen. In some cases the response may in-
volve providing information, whereas in others the agency
may rescind a penalty, compensate a victim, or investigate a
disturbance. While the agencies it offers access to and ser-
vices it delivers are highly similar to in-person petitioning,
the Mayor’s Mailbox also differs in important ways. Whereas
visiting petition ofﬁces creates opportunities for disruptive
protest tactics, online contacting keeps citizens at a physical
remove from government buildings and ofﬁcials.
China’s prefectural mayors are the chief executives of
prefectural governments. Their appointments and promo-
tions are decided by political authorities, not electoral con-
tests. Mayors generally serve terms of two to three years, in
part to combat the development of entrenched local in-
terests and corruption. Their professional incentives reward
exceptional economic performance but impose few sanc-
tions for poor performance, short of being prosecuted for
corruption (Landry 2008). Although mayors are not di-
rectly involved in answering the vast majority of letters
received through the Mayor’s Mailbox, they are prominently
featured in the branding of this service institution. Aside
from its name, these webpages often feature mayors’ pho-
tographs and exhortations to “Write me a letter” (ﬁg. 1).
Between 2012 and 2013, we conducted ﬁve ﬁeld exper-
iments involving the Mayor’s Mailboxes of China’s pre-
fectural governments.6 In each study, prefectural govern-
ments received appeals from putative citizens requesting
information about various policies. This behavioral mea-
sure of constituency service—do ofﬁcials respond to such
requests with helpful information?—offers appealing fea-
tures compared to alternative empirical approaches. Sur-
veys and interviews that ask political elites to reﬂect on and
report their interactions with constituents may be subject to5. For an overview of China’s Government Online project, see http://
goo.gl/fCVEKI (accessed April 26, 2017).
6. The experimental treatments tested the effects of citizen ethnicity,
party status, connections to journalists, and connections to ofﬁcials on
government responsiveness to citizen requests. Treatments were assigned
using simple randomization; they are therefore uncorrelated in expecta-
tion with the predictors of responsiveness analyzed in this study. The ﬁrst
study is detailed in Distelhorst and Hou (2014).
This content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms nonresponse bias and social desirability bias. Talking about
constituency service is much easier than devoting scarce
resources to providing service. Field audits can yield na-
tional measures of the quality of constituency service that
are not subject to these biases and have been usefully em-
ployed in a variety of settings (Broockman 2013; Butler
and Broockman 2011; Butler et al. 2012; Carnes and Hol-
bein 2015; Dropp and Peskowitz 2012; Loewen and Mac-
Kenzie 2013; McClendon 2016; Putnam 1994; Spada and
Guimarães 2013; Spada et al. 2012; White et al. 2015).
At the same time, there are important limitations and
risks to studying constituency service through ﬁeld audits.
Ethical considerations in the design of ﬁeld experiments
include the use of deception and the possibility that audit
stimuli may distort the allocation of ofﬁcial effort (Malesky
2013; McClendon 2013). Our research design was guided
by the description of the Putnam (1994) ﬁeld audit of ser-
vice institutions in Italy: “slightly deceptive, but innocuous
and highly informative” (73). The study was designed to
request information expected to be readily available to local
ofﬁcials, and the resulting protocol was approved by the
relevant Institutional Review Board. A second potential lim-
itation is that requests for assistance are artiﬁcial, written by
researchers rather than actual citizens. Using the requests of
actual citizens in publicly available letters to government (see
table 4 below), we designed our queries to have verisimili-
tude in both language and topic choice. The following letter
was submitted in the ﬁrst wave of the audit (letters from the
other four waves are reported in online app. B):
Respected Leader,
I have been unable to ﬁnd stable work for a long
time, and my economic situation is not good. Do I
have the opportunity to apply for the Minimum
Livelihood Guarantee? What conditions would I need
to satisfy to receive the Minimum Livelihood Guar-
antee?
With gratitude for leaders’ care,
[Name]
We measure the quality of constituency service by ex-
amining how government agencies responded to these
requests. When governments responded to these letters, we
coded whether the response was informative or not. Un-
informative responses included statements that the request
was “accepted” and claims that the service request was too
vague.7 When governments did respond, the majority7. In app. C, we list all 54 responses from government that we coded
as uninformative.
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an example of which is provided in the following section.
The audit included letters from a range of citizen iden-
tities: unemployed individuals, employed migrant workers,
entrepreneurs, and recent college graduates (table 1). They
represent a range of socioeconomic strata in contemporary
China, with entrepreneurs and university graduates at the
upper end and unemployed individuals and migrant work-
ers at the lower end. Each letter requested some type of
policy information: access to poverty relief funds, rulesThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms about the minimum wage, business taxation policies, and
the process for starting a new business. In each wave, we
attempted to submit requests to 336 political jurisdictions.
In some jurisdictions we were unable to ﬁnd an online
channel for contacting ofﬁcials. In others, the channel ap-
peared to exist but was unusable (e.g., e-mail bounced
back). In still others, the channel existed, but it placed re-
quirements on requesters that we were unable to satisfy,
such as providing identiﬁcation card numbers correspond-
ing to the individual. As these requirements and govern-Figure 1. The Mayor’s Mailbox constituency service front page for Nanjing, China, a prefecture of approximately eight million people in eastern China. The
button next to the photo of Mayor Miao Ruilin says “I want to write a letter.” Source: http://szxx.nj.gov.cn/page/index.jsp (accessed February 6, 2015).Table 1. Constituency Service Requests in the AuditWave Fielded Citizen Identity01.008.245 o
and ConditioService Requestedn June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
ns (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-cN1 July 2012 Unemployed Accessing poverty relief 258
2 May 2013 Unemployed Accessing poverty relief 235
3 June 2013 Migrant worker Minimum wage regulations 260
4 July 2013 Recent graduate Starting new business 230
5 August 2013 Entrepreneur Business tax information 242Note. Key features of the ﬁve waves of the ﬁeld audit. In total, local agencies received 1,225 letters. Translations of each letter are
presented in app. B.).
8. See US Census Bureau, “Congressional Apportionment: 2010 Cen-
sus Briefs” (http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf ; ac-
cessed April 26, 2017).
9. Although the outcome is dichotomous, ﬁtting logistic models with
ﬁxed effects has fallen out of favor because of the incidental parameters
problem (Greene 2004). Nonetheless, we report the results of logistic
regressions in app. table A3; the main results are robust.
000 / Constituency Service under Nondemocratic Rule Greg Distelhorst and Yue Houment websites changed over time, the sample size varies by
wave from230 to 260 prefectures, a potential source of bias we
examine in the results section.
CHINA’S CONSTITUENCY SERVICE
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
China’s prefectural governments provided a relatively high
level of responsiveness to citizen requests for information.
The Mayor’s Mailbox offered useful information in re-
sponse to 43% (532 of 1,225) of appeals for assistance in the
queries described above. Clustering errors by prefecture,
this yields a 95% conﬁdence interval of 39%–47% for the
estimated mean response rate to these service requests. A
typical informative response to the query about accessing
income assistance (above) is given below:
Dear Comrade,
Whether you qualify for Minimum Livelihood
Guarantee (dibao) depends on your household in-
come, and you should apply on behalf of your house-
hold. According to the new standard implemented
this year, if your household income is lower than
350 yuan per month (urban) or 2000 yuan per year
(rural), you are eligible to apply for dibao.
The application process is as follows: an applicant
submits an application, and the street committee or
work unit processes the application. Then the district
or township government approves or rejects the ap-
plication. If approved, dibao certiﬁcates will be dis-
tributed and you will be informed on how to collect
the dibao cash transfer.
Prefectural Bureau of Civil Affairs
The responsiveness of China’s mayors’ ofﬁces falls
squarely in the middle of the ﬁndings in previous ﬁeld audits
of constituency service in democracies (table 2). The ma-
jority of studies have taken place in the United States, where
the highest responsiveness (78%) came from local election
commissions contacted in White et al. (2015). When it
comes to state legislators and congresspeople, response rates
were much closer to what we observe in contemporary
China, ranging from 19% to 52%. Several of these studies
inquired about politicians’ policy positions, an inquiry that
generally produced lower response rates than service re-
quests (Butler et al. 2012). This may explain the very low
responsiveness of Brazilian candidates in Spada et al. (2012).
China’s mayors’ ofﬁces also exhibit greater responsiveness
than the Italian bureaucrats contacted in Putnam (1994).
China’s mayors’ ofﬁces are comparably responsive to
those of many politicians in established democracies, atThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms least when responding to requests for information. How-
ever, local context must be kept in mind when interpreting
these comparisons. Prefectural governments in China are
large bureaucracies with budgets in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. They have massive ﬁnancial and human
resources at their disposal, should they choose to dedicate
them to providing high-quality constituency service. In con-
trast, local legislators in the United States generally have
relatively limited staff and resources to provide constituency
service. Chinese prefectural jurisdictions are also relatively
large, averaging nearly four million residents, compared to
711,000 residents in the average US congressional district in
2010.8 Service provided through the Mayor’s Mailbox in
China’s prefectures takes place at a larger scale in terms of
both government resources and the population served.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To test the state capacity, economic modernization, and
social conﬂict hypotheses of nondemocratic constituency
service, we estimate regression models of government re-
sponsiveness, using the geographic variation across pre-
fectures to explore the correlates of high-quality service.
Our model is
Yik p bXi 1 lDik 1 hk 1 εik: ð1Þ
Equation (1) combines the ﬁve studies such that Yik indi-
cates whether the government in prefecture i provided a
helpful response in study k. Our key explanatory variables
are prefectural socioeconomic indicators (Xi). We also in-
clude study ﬁxed effects (hk). Each wave of the audit also
had experimental manipulations that are peripheral to the
research question of the present study; we adjust for them
by including each experiment’s binary treatment indicator
(Dik) as a control. The random and nonstratiﬁed assignment
of experimental treatments means that Dik is not, in ex-
pectation, correlated with unobservable prefectural charac-
teristics that might drive variation in service quality. The
effects of interest are estimated by b.
We ﬁrst present ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
models with varying combinations of the explanatory vari-
ables and province ﬁxed effects.9 As discussed in the data
section, we have multiple observations for each prefecture,
but the explanatory variables do not vary within prefec-01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
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10. At the end of 2013, China’s migrant worker population was esti-
mated to be 245 million. See http://goo.gl/d4Ofne (accessed April 26, 2017).
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rors clustered by prefecture to account for the grouped
structure of the data.
We then compare OLS estimates to those obtained from
kernel-regularized least squares (KRLS; Hainmueller and
Hazlett 2014). KRLS is a machine learning estimation
procedure that allows for higher-order interactions between
predictors, nonlinearity, and heterogeneous effects while
also yielding easy to interpret marginal effects. We employ
KRLS to address the possibility that the effects we detect are
artifacts of model misspeciﬁcation. Nevertheless, we are aware
that KRLS does not protect against omitted variable bias that
may limit our study.
We measure economic modernization with the pro-
portion of the local economic output accounted for by the
primary sector. Primary-sector economic activity includes
farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and ﬁshing. Manu-
facturing, construction, mining, and utilities make up the
secondary sector, and all remaining activity falls into the
tertiary (service) sector. The growth of the secondary and
tertiary sectors is a standard indicator of modernization
and appears in China’s ofﬁcial evaluation rubric for mu-
nicipal modernization (Landry 2008, 83).
Measuring local social unrest on a national scale is an
empirical challenge in China. There are no comprehensive
public records on local social unrest. To measure local so-
cial unrest, we use data on local labor protests gathered by
the China Strikes project (Elfstrom 2012). Labor protests,
whether collective (Lee 2007) or individual (Fu 2017), are
an important part of the landscape of contention in China.
This project catalogued labor unrest incidents on the basis
of reports by the news media and labor organizations. This
measure likely exhibits higher measurement error in ruralThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms areas, where media organizations are more sparse, as well as
in localities with greater media restrictions. Nonetheless, it
represents a rich source of data on local social conﬂict in
China, and compiling data sets from media reports remains
a widely used approach to studying local social unrest in
China (Cai 2010; Wallace and Weiss 2015). It is also im-
portant to note that many reported labor incidents from
China Strikes are derived from independent blogs and in-
dividual tips via the project’s “submit a report” function.
Thus, we expect measurement error to be smaller than in
data sets that rely solely on media reports. In total, the data
set records 769 labor protests across 177 prefectures be-
tween 2008 and 2012. Labor unrest is a particularly salient
form of social instability because of the symbolic link be-
tween Communist authority and labor, the history of work-
ers’ movements in overthrowing authoritarian regimes,
and the sheer number of migrant workers in contemporary
China.10 As a robustness check, we also use data on the
number of anti-Japanese protests (Wallace and Weiss 2015)
as an alternative measure of local social unrest.
We measure local government capacity using prefectural
government revenue per capita. Local ﬁscal revenue offers a
more direct measure of government capacity than GDP and
is arguably less subject to political manipulation (Lü and
Landry 2014). Finally, as the Mayor’s Mailbox is an online
channel of communication, we also explore whether service
quality may be explained by the level of internet develop-
ment across prefectures. We measure local internet devel-
opment by broadband internet subscribers (per capita).
Measures of internet subscribers, labor protests, and gov-Table 2. Field Audits of Constituency Service in Democracies and ChinaCountry Subjects Issue01.008.245 o
and ConditionService Rate (%)n June 05, 2017 16:03:25 P
s (http://www.journals.uchStudyUnited States Election ofﬁcials Voter identiﬁcation 78 White et al. (2015)
United States State legislators Voter registration 57 Butler and Broockman (2011)
United States Congresspeople Immigration 52 Butler et al. (2012)
United States State legislators Immigration 51 Butler et al. (2012)
China Mayors Beneﬁts and regulations 43 . . .
United States State legislators Unemployment 42 Broockman (2013)
United States Congresspeople Positions: immigration 38 Butler et al. (2012)
Italy Local bureaucrats Policy implementation 33 Putnam (1994)
Brazil Mayoral candidates Position: tax policy 29 Spada and Guimarães (2013)
South Africa Local councillors Infrastructure 22 McClendon (2016)
United States State legislators Positions: immigration 19 Butler et al. (2012)
Brazil Local/federal candidates Positions: unemployment 14 Spada et al. (2012)M
icago.edu/t-and-c).
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distributions. Summary statistics of these variables are
shown in appendix A.
Our outcome measure is a binary indicator of whether
the government agency provided a helpful response to a
request for assistance (1) or not (0). In individual studies
we developed more detailed measures of the helpfulness of
government responses. However, because of variation in
the letters, these scales are not intuitively comparable across
studies. The binary indicator of helpful responses offers a
relatively straightforward way of aggregating outcome data
across studies, at the cost of reducing variation in the de-
pendent variable. Across the ﬁve studies, a response is
coded as helpful if it provides us with information on the
relevant policy or contact information of relevant bureau-
cracies. Appendix C lists all responses that are coded non-
helpful. Our measure of responsiveness is similar to that of
studies conducted in democratic contexts, where respon-
siveness was measured by whether “the legislator repl[ied]
or not” (Butler and Broockman 2011, 467), whether “the
reply contained full and accurate information” about the
speciﬁc policy (White et al. 2015, 134), or whether “the pol-
itician supplied the requested information directly or pro-
vided the contact information for the bureaucrat” (McClendon
2016, 64). When we were unable to submit a request to a
prefecture, that prefecture study observation is excluded
from our analysis.11 We submitted 1,225 letters in total and
received 532 helpful replies (43.4%). We were able to submit
all ﬁve requests to 177 prefectures in total, and 40 prefectures
were excluded entirely from the audit (app. ﬁg. A1).
RESULTS
We ﬁnd evidence in support of the economic modernity
and social unrest hypotheses but little role for government
capacity in explaining the quality of service institutions
(table 3). Local government capacity, although a bivariate
predictor, has no effect after controlling for the other fac-
tors.12 On the other hand, local labor unrest and economic
modernity predict responsiveness in all models.13 Internet11. In many cases, failed submissions resulted from a limitation of the
research design as opposed to a poor government website. Many websites
requested state-issued identiﬁcation card numbers that our ﬁctitious
requesters did not have. In those cases, failed submission simply reﬂects
the mechanics of the study rather than a shortcoming of the constituency
service channel.
12. As a robustness check, we use local government expenditure and
public-sector employment as alternative measures of local government
capacity in app. table A4. Again, neither is a signiﬁcant predictor of re-
sponsiveness.
13. We also measure social unrest by looking at the total number of
anti-Japanese protests from August 15 to the end of September 2012
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms development, plausibly correlated with economic modern-
ization, is a bivariate predictor of service quality, but its
effects shrink to statistical insigniﬁcance in the full models.
In columns 7 and 8, we investigate whether these effects
are the result of model speciﬁcation decisions by ﬁtting
models using KRLS. The effects of economic modernization
and social stability are robust to this alternative estimation
procedure. Neither state capacity nor internet development
is a predictor of service quality in these ﬂexible models.
However, KRLS addresses only the threat of model mis-
speciﬁcation, not the possibility of omitted variable bias.
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
The main results offer support for the hypotheses that
economic modernization and social conﬂict are associated
with improved authoritarian constituency service. How-
ever, one alternative hypothesis might hold that China is
characterized by distinctive regional variation in gover-
nance or political culture (Goodman 1997) correlated with
our measure of economic modernization. China’s wealthy
coastal provinces are frequently credited with enjoying su-
perior governance in a variety of dimensions, and these
provinces also have larger industrial and service sectors.
Examining a map of the predicted probability of local re-
sponsiveness to the letters in the audit (ﬁg. 2), we do ﬁnd
that southeastern China exhibits higher-quality institutions
than northeastern or southwestern regions. To examine
whether our variables of interest were confounded by these
regional characteristics, we estimate models with province
ﬁxed effects in table 3, columns 6 and 8. If distinctive re-
gional features confounded our estimation, we would ex-
pect effects to attenuate. Instead, the effects of social unrest
remain signiﬁcant, and the effects of modernization actu-
ally strengthen after controlling for unobserved province-
level confounders.
A second alternative hypothesis holds that improved
constituency service in economically modernized areas may
result from the goal of authoritarian governments to co-opt
socioeconomic elites. Socioeconomic elites have been im-
plicated in a number of revolutionary democratizing move-
ments (Gandhi 2008), and previous research on authori-
tarian institutions highlights the importance of co-opting
these elites (Lust-Okar 2005;Magaloni 2006). Our audit used
citizen aliases from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds,
from migrant workers to recent university graduates and
entrepreneurs. If constituency service is driven by this need
for elite co-optation, we may expect service quality to varyreported in Wallace and Weiss (2014). This alternative measure of social
unrest is a similarly strong predictor of responsiveness. See app. table A6.
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Volume 79 Number 3 July 2017 / 000on the basis of the socioeconomic status of the citizen
making the request. However, we ﬁnd almost no variation in
response rate across these social identities (see app. table A2).
Audits using migrant workers and university graduates were
ﬁelded in consecutive months and resulted in highly similar
response rates of 46.2% and 45.2%, respectively.14 These ﬁnd-
ings are not consistent with a logic of authoritarian constit-
uency service motivated by elite co-optation.A DEMAND-DRIVEN LOGIC OF SERVICE QUALITY
Drawing on the results above, this section develops a
demand-driven logic of constituency service in nondemo-
cratic politics. Government responsiveness to citizen appeals
with effectively no collective action potential and regional
variation in this responsiveness suggest a logic that goes
beyond short-term prevention of collective action. Instead,
our model focuses on the information generated by service
requests and government incentives to ensure a steady ﬂow
of that information from citizens to ofﬁcials. After devel-14. We acknowledge that identities are to some extent confounded
with time, as the higher-status requesters appear in later waves. However,
waves 2–5 occurred within a four-month window and included both high-
and low-status requesters, with little variation in responsiveness.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms oping this simple model and exploring its implications, we
add supportive evidence from analysis of real constituency
service requests in China.
Our logic of constituency service builds on models of
nondemocratic politics that posit rulers’ interest in collect-
ing information about public preferences and policy out-
comes. Government access to this information is implicit
in assertions that autocrats seek to secure the cooperation
and productive activity of other social groups (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2002; Chen and Xu 2017; Gandhi and
Przeworski 2007; Geddes 1999). How do rulers know which
policies incentivize cooperation without obtaining informa-
tion about public preferences and policy outcomes? Even a
stylized “rational autocrat” requires information about how
tax policies shape citizen willingness to engage in productive
activities (McGuire and Olson 1996; Olson 1993).
Nondemocratic states struggle to collect this information
(Lorentzen 2013). Under threat of repression for politically
transgressive speech, citizens may withhold information about
their preferences (Jiang and Yang 2016), in extreme cases
producing revolutionary movements that appear seemingly
overnight (Kuran 1991). In the absence of free press, lower-
level ofﬁcials have little incentive to reveal their own poor per-
formance to superiors. Nondemocracies respond to these in-
formational challenges with a variety of institutions that gatherTable 3. Predictors of Constituency Service Quality in ChinaOLS Estimation01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edKRLS Estimation(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)u/t-and-c).(8)Primary sector share 2.676*** 2.592* 21.198*** 2.297** 2.474***
(.208) (.326) (.400) (.117) (.106)Strikes (log) .103*** .092*** .065** .052*** .039***
(.021) (.028) (.032) (.013) (.013)Broadband per capita (log) .065*** .024 2.053 .008 2.010
(.024) (.036) (.046) (.013) (.012)Government revenue per capita (log) .049** 2.051 2.051 2.013 2.007
(.023) (.039) (.043) (.011) (.010)Wave ﬁxed effects ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Province ﬁxed effects ✔ ✔
Constant ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ . . . . . .
Observations 1,225 1,225 1,212 1,225 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,212
R2 .026 .039 .022 .019 .046 .146 .070 .260Note. Standard errors clustered by prefecture are shown in parentheses. The outcome is whether local government responded to a request for constituency
service with helpful information (1) or not (0). Note that ﬁxed effects in KRLS differ from those in OLS. Rather than adjusting for group-speciﬁc means, they
allow for complex interactions between each ﬁxed-effects indicator and other predictors in the model.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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viding openings for political challenge. Their information-
gathering channels include technological and human surveil-
lance (Morozov 2012), media freedomwithin bounds (Egorov,
Guriev, and Sonin 2009; Lorentzen 2014), limited electoral
contests (Blaydes 2010; Magaloni 2006), public opinion poll-
ing (Dimitrov 2014a; Henn 1998), and even monitoring pro-
tests (Lorentzen 2013).
Our theory begins by recognizing that constituency ser-
vice institutions contribute to resolving information prob-
lems in nondemocratic regimes, but they can serve this
purpose only under certain conditions. The informational
value of citizen appeals to authoritarian regimes is estab-
lished by Dimitrov’s recent archival research on the Soviet
Union (Dimitrov 2014a), Bulgaria (Dimitrov 2014b), and
China (Dimitrov 2015). We build on this insight to develop
a model of constituency service that explains varying levels
of local responsiveness to citizen appeals. It begins with the
citizen (ﬁg. 3). She decides whether to make an appeal on
the basis of two considerations: her need for service and the
perceived probability that the institution will satisfy her
request. Taken together, need and beliefs about government
responsiveness determine the expected return of making an
appeal. If the expected return is greater than the costThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms (largely the opportunity cost of time spent) of composing
and submitting an appeal, then the citizen uses the insti-
tution. If the citizen expects a negative return, she does not
bother.
On the receiving side, government interest in the appeal
comes from the information contained therein. Citizen
appeals to nondemocratic authorities transmit information
from the public to political elites. Appeals may contain in-
formation about citizen opinions on public policy, dissat-
isfaction with government ofﬁcials, and conﬂicts between
social actors (Dimitrov 2015). The government can extract
this information from appeals and use it to identify policy
failures and successes, identify agencies that are performing
well and poorly, and attempt to resolve potentially disruptive
social conﬂicts.
The constituency service institution either responds to
the citizen’s appeal or neglects to do so, either by ignoring it
or by responding unhelpfully. The citizen observes this out-
come and adjusts her beliefs accordingly. If the institution
addresses her appeal, the perceived probability that the in-
stitution will satisfy future appeals is maintained or im-
proved. However, if it ignores the appeal or offers an un-
helpful response, perceived probability of response falls. If
the citizen’s expected return falls below the cost of submit-Figure 2. Predicted government responsiveness to constituency service requests. Estimated probabilities of response for each prefecture in the study. White
is 100% probability of responding to a letter, and black is 0%. We obtain predicted values from the KRLS model with province ﬁxed effects estimated in
table 3, column 8.01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
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15. As our model focuses on the transitions that citizens make from
agricultural to industrial and service employment, we expect that the local
share of agricultural employment would also be a strong predictor of
responsiveness. We present these alternative estimations in app. table A9,
with the caveat that employment share data are missing from 54 pre-
fectures (16% of the population) in a nonrandom way; the missing data
tend to come from prefectures where agriculture is more predominant.
Volume 79 Number 3 July 2017 / 000ting an appeal, she exits the institution and possibly seeks
resolution through alternative means.
In this logic, the amount of information that govern-
ment can extract from constituency service institutions in-
creases with citizen demand for service. When large num-
bers of citizens seek service, the government has the potential
to obtain more information through service institutions.
This implies that the costs to the government of poor service
increase in high-demand localities. As citizens’ perceived
probability of response falls, they forgo larger volumes of
information that could have been obtained through the con-
stituency service channel.
Government returns to investing in high-quality con-
stituency service institutions are therefore increasing with
citizen demand. The precise accounting varies according to
the function relating the number of citizens who participate
to the value of the information gleaned by government. For
example, it seems likely that the informational returns to
the marginal service request are decreasing with increased
volume. However, as long as the total value of information
is increasing with citizen demand (i.e., the value of the
marginal service request is nonnegative), government in-
centives for responsiveness are also increasing with citizen
demand. This is our demand-driven logic of constituency
service.This content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms We argue that the pattern of responsiveness revealed by
the ﬁeld audit reﬂects variation in citizen demand for ser-
vice with modernization and social conﬂict. Because higher
demand makes these institutions more valuable to gov-
ernment, we observe higher-quality institutions in these
higher-demand localities.
Consider ﬁrst the predictive power of economic mod-
ernization over government capacity and internet pene-
tration. As citizens move from agricultural to industrial
economic activity, their reliance on public services provided
by bureaucratic institutions increases.15 The agricultural
economy in China remains characterized by small house-
hold farms organized into villages with populations in the
hundreds or low thousands. Village projects account for a
signiﬁcant portion of local public-goods spending, includ-
ing contributions to roads, irrigation, schools, and sanita-
tion projects (Luo et al. 2007; Tsai 2007). Although these
villages are under the jurisdiction of prefectural and county
governments, the provision of public goods is relatively
communal and village driven, with fewer layers of bu-
reaucracy between individuals and public-goods providers.
These features of rural China permit informal institutions
such as lineage groups and clans to play an important role
in the local provision of public goods (Tsai 2007) and en-
forcement of property rights (Mattingly 2016).
In urban China, these goods and services are adminis-
tered primarily by government bureaucracies. At the pre-
fectural level these agencies serve millions of citizens, with
duties distributed across a variety of specialized agencies:
transportation, industry and commerce, public works, social
security, and so forth. This inserts bureaucratic processes
between citizens and access to public goods. In addition, a
signiﬁcant share of China’s emerging social welfare system is
distributed through formal employment relationships char-
acteristic of the industrial and service sectors. Citizens in
economically modernized areas are therefore eligible for a
range of government programs; these programs deliver
beneﬁts but also create confusion and grievances about their
administration. Thus, as in other modern regulatory states,
Chinese citizens in economically modernized areas ﬁnd them-
selves living “in a red tape era in which a lot of people can’t get
through the bureaucracy” (Cain et al. 1987, 88). We thereforeFigure 3. Simple model of constituency service that underlies the demand-
driven logic. A citizen decides whether to submit an appeal on the basis of
the perceived probability that the institution will satisfy her request. If her
expected returns exceed the cost of making a request, she submits an
appeal. The government receives information from the appeal, which may
be valuable for adjusting policy, identifying low-performing ofﬁcials, and
resolving conﬂicts. The government then decides whether to address the
appeal or not. In response, the citizen adjusts her perceived likelihood of
government responsiveness in the future. If her expected returns from
participation fall below the cost of making an appeal, the citizen exits and
ceases transmitting information to the government through this institution.01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
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challenges is higher in economically modern localities.
We also posit that higher levels of social conﬂict—
whether that conﬂict is among citizens or between citizens
and ofﬁcials—drive increased demand for constituency
service. When embroiled in disputes with government
agencies, employers, business partners, and other economic
actors, citizens may appeal to a variety of authorities and
institutions. Constituency service institutions, which en-
treat citizens to bring their complaints to ofﬁcials, are a
natural magnet for such conﬂicts.16
The demand-driven logic links this regional variation in
the demand for service to variation in institutional quality.
We observe more responsive institutions, on average, in
localities where citizen demand is the highest: those that are
economically modernized and characterized by higher
levels of social conﬂict. The model also explains the puz-
zlingly high baseline response rate detected in the ﬁeld
audit. The threat of collective action ﬁgures prominently in
scholarly thought on nondemocratic rule, and recent em-
pirical work conﬁrms that authoritarian ofﬁcials respond at
higher rates to citizen appeals with greater potential for
collective action (Chen et al. 2016). However, our audit
ﬁnds that authoritarian ofﬁcials also respond to prosaic
citizen appeals with minimal collective action potential. For
example, our hypothetical student inquiring about starting
a business appears to be very far from taking to the street to
protest, yet he received the same level of responsiveness as
queries about the minimum livelihood guarantee. If the
logic of responsiveness is primarily guided by threat of
collective action, what is the government’s incentive to
respond to such requests?
The model explains responsiveness to requests with
minimal collective action potential by highlighting the
value of voluntary transfers of information from the public
to the government. When service institutions are func-
tioning well, citizens proactively transmit this information
to government agencies. However, unlike covert surveil-
lance or media coverage, the informational value of con-
stituency service depends on voluntary political participa-
tion. Nondemocratic governments must therefore nurture
public engagement with service channels to sustain these
voluntary ﬂows of information. While the state can initially16. In light of the Lorentzen (2013) argument that protests themselves
offer useful information to the regime, it is possible that high-protest
localities also receive more information through the protest channel, po-
tentially lowering the importance of collecting information from constit-
uency service requests. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
This content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms promote use of these institutions through the media, sus-
taining voluntary engagement requires that service insti-
tutions offer some probability of resolving the issues these
citizens raise.17 If constituency service institutions are in-
effective, citizens’ incentives to spend time communicating
these problems decline, and the supply of information falls.
They may even disengage completely with these institu-
tions, depriving the state of valuable information.THE CONTENT OF CITIZEN APPEALS
If frustration with bureaucratized public-goods provision
and social conﬂict are drivers of citizen demand for con-
stituency service, we expect these topics to be especially
prevalent in citizen constituency service appeals. While we
cannot present a similarly complete audit of citizen letters
to ofﬁcials, we can examine a sample of publicly posted
appeals to local ofﬁcials. Many local governments post
letters received through the Mayor’s Mailbox to their
websites. This serves as a public demonstration of govern-
ment responsiveness and also offers information to would-
be contacters. We collected and analyzed 100 publicly
posted letters from 10 randomly sampled prefectures across
China. We present these results with an important caveat:
local ofﬁcials likely screened these letters before making
them publicly available. Therefore, they do not constitute a
random sample of all appeals submitted by citizens. Our
sample likely underrepresents criticisms of government and
accusations of ofﬁcial malfeasance.
Observed citizen appeals to the Mayor’s Mailbox fell
into three broad categories (table 4). First, citizens pre-
dominantly requested assistance surrounding public goods
and service provided by government. Public-goods appeals
can be further divided into three groups. The most com-
mon appeals (34%) dealt with access to social services and
beneﬁts, including health insurance, housing subsidies, dis-
ability beneﬁts, employment training, work injury insur-
ance, pension payments, maternity beneﬁts, and education.
Letters included both grievances, typically complaints about
not receiving expected beneﬁts, and policy inquiries sur-
rounding conditions of eligibility and other issues. Public-17. Dimitrov (2014b) contains a thoughtful discussion of citizens’
incentive to complain as a function of their trust in central authorities. In
our model, citizens’ incentive to complain—recognizing that complaining
costs their time and mental energy—depends on the perceived probability
that complaining will lead to the satisfactory resolution of their grievance,
dispute, or question. High trust in either central or local political au-
thorities could contribute to this belief, but citizens’ perception of this
probability may be inﬂuenced by other factors as well.
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cited problems with roads, public transportation, parks,
heating, and water supply and pertained to both provision
(“when will the Jinxing village road be laid?”) and mainte-
nance (“why aren’t the lights on either side of Qingyun Road
installed yet?”). Public service appeals also dealt with regu-
latory and legal activities (23%). These appeals dealt with
policing, enforcement of environmental regulations, pro-
fessional certiﬁcations, family planning policies, and ad-
ministration of the civil service. Taken together, appeals
surrounding public goods and services accounted for 76% of
all letters in our sample.
The second major category of letters requested local
governments’ intercession in economic disputes (17%). Citi-
zens appealed for assistance from mayors’ ofﬁces in disputes
with employers, business partners, service providers such as
hospitals and schools, and even other government agencies.
One farmer complained about insufﬁcient compensation for
ﬁelds reclaimed by the village: “Just before harvest, the village
suddenly decided to build a reservoir, and they were only
willing to offer 500 yuan in compensation. Where is the jus-
tice?” Another recounted a dispute with an employer that led
to the threat of violent confrontation: “When we arrived we
saw that the mine had arranged for over ﬁfty maﬁa thugs to
threaten us! Forget about talking things over! Facing this
dangerous situation we called [the police], but over oneThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms hour later no police had arrived.” Conﬂicts over housing
fees and residential maintenance were also common.
The third group of appeals contained accusations of
ofﬁcial corruption. Only a minority of public letters (4%)
reported corruption, but they stood out for their detail.
Three letters reported an allegedly corrupted village elec-
tion: “[the village] stripped nearly 100 people working
outside the village of their voting rights. I hope that the
busy leaders will take time to come verify this and restore
our rights.” Another accused village ofﬁcials of fraud in a
program intended to compensate villagers for the conser-
vation of farmland. One threatened to report malfeasant
ofﬁcials to bureaucratic superiors: “If there is no result from
the related department at the prefectural level, we will
proceed to report to higher levels [of government], report-
ing all the way to Beijing.” As noted above, letters that
contain accusations of ofﬁcial corruption are likely screened
by ofﬁcials and therefore underrepresented in our sample.
We proposed above that frustrations with bureaucra-
tized public-goods provision and social conﬂict were key
drivers of citizen demand for constituency service. Con-
sistent with this claim, publicly available citizen appeals
deal overwhelmingly (76%) with problems in public goods
and services. A signiﬁcant proportion (17%) also appeal for
ofﬁcial intercession in economic and social conﬂicts. In
light of the demand-driven logic of constituency service,Table 4. Content of Citizen Service RequestsContent % Example QuotesPublic goods and policy:
Social beneﬁts: education, health insurance,
pensions, subsidies, public housing
34% • How can I access the Delayed Parenthood subsidy?
• . . . my employer did not contribute to my housing fund.
• What is the subsidy for returning farmland to forest?Infrastructure: roads, public transportation,
utilities23% • The heating . . . leaves rooms extremely cold.
• Can you pave a two-kilometer concrete road for us?
• It is a “three-without” village: without school, without medical clinic, and
without phone service or internet.Regulation: public order, environmental
regulation, certiﬁcations23% • The Mahjongg House is disturbing public order.
• . . . the natural gas station often shortchanges customers, and the
government makes no inquiries.Economic disputes 17% • . . . but irrigation was obstructed by local villager Du Guang and other
illegal miners.
• . . . it is already over one year since the contracted date for handing over
the property.Reporting corruption 4% • You can come investigate; there are many sham village committees.
• They did not allow villagers working outside the village [to vote by
proxy]. Is such an election valid?Note. Content of 100 letters from citizens to the Mayor’s Mailbox in 10 randomly sampled prefectures in May 2014. Percentages sum to greater than 100%
because some letters contained multiple topics.01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
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sponsive constituency service institutions in China’s more
economically modernized and higher-conﬂict jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of an electoral connection between citizens
and ofﬁcials, what drives constituency service in non-
democracies? Our ﬁeld audit demonstrated that nondem-
ocratic institutions of constituency service can be surpris-
ingly responsive to appeals in the absence of collective
action threats. China’s Mayor’s Mailbox exhibited compa-
rable responsiveness to informational requests to similar
institutions in several democracies (table 2). We found that
service quality was correlated with both economic moderni-
zation and social conﬂict. Building on these ﬁndings and
the insight that service institutions offer an important source
of information for nondemocratic political regimes, we
developed a demand-driven logic of nondemocratic con-
stituency service. In order to sustain voluntary transfers of
information from the public, service institutions must be
responsive to citizen appeals. Government incentive to re-
spond is therefore increasing with citizen demand.
Rather than replacing classical theoretical frameworks
of authoritarian rule that emphasize the prevention of col-
lective action, our logic suggests reﬁnements to that frame-
work. Even if the ultimate motivation of authoritarian rul-
ers is to prevent collective action and stay in power, the
channels through which they achieve that goal may involve
providing responsive government institutions that ensure a
steady ﬂow of information from the public into the hands
of ofﬁcial decision makers. This demand-driven logic of
service helps to explain why ofﬁcials with no electoral
connection to the public exhibit responsiveness even when
they face little threat of collective action. None of the ser-
vice requests in our ﬁeld audit appeared likely to generate
episodes of social instability, yet local governments still
responded to nearly half of them.
Although our model proposes that modernization drives
demand for service by creating confusion and grievances
surrounding the bureaucratization of public-goods provi-
sion, there are other possible causal pathways as well. One
possibility is that modernized localities simply have larger
proportions of educated and politically sophisticated citi-
zens. These citizens may have a better understanding of
both the services they are entitled to and the institutions
through which to demand access. This mechanism would
be familiar to the original modernization theorists, who
viewed increasing education levels as central to the mod-
ernization syndrome. While it is difﬁcult to conclusivelyThis content downloaded from 018.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms adjudicate between these hypotheses in this study, we
looked for evidence of the effects of education by adding
predictors for public spending on education, schools per
capita, and teachers per capita in appendix table A8. None
are signiﬁcant predictors nor attenuate the estimated effect
of economic modernization.
Our model also puts information collection at the center
and relegates government concerns about collective action
to the background. It does so in light of high government
responsiveness to requests with very low collective action
potential, such as inquiries about starting a new business.
However, one alternative interpretation of the effect of so-
cial conﬂict might posit that local conﬂicts make the gov-
ernment more anxious about collective action in all in-
teractions with citizens, which in turn drives improved
responsiveness to all constituency service requests. In this
logic, the purpose of improved responsiveness is still to
forestall collective action, but this improved responsiveness
spills over into requests with low collective action potential.
This would mean that not only does the Chinese adage
“The bigger the disruption, the bigger the solution” hold, as
demonstrated by Chen et al. (2016), but local social conﬂict
actually leads institutions to become more responsive to all
citizens. The hypothesis that conﬂict in an authoritarian
regime prompts certain institutions to grow more respon-
sive to the public is not inconsistent with the ﬁndings of
this study. We leave this hypothesis to future research,
noting, however, that this conﬂict-focused theory leaves un-
explained the large impact of economic modernization de-
tected in our study.
While the empirical ﬁndings are consistent with a demand-
driven logic of constituency service, there are important
limitations to drawing causal inferences from cross-sectional
studies of observational data. Flexible estimation procedures
like KRLS help to address misspeciﬁcation bias, but they
cannot overcome concerns about omitted variable bias, as
neither economic modernization nor local social conﬂict is
randomly assigned to localities. It remains possible that un-
observed confounders are responsible for the observed cor-
relations between constituency service and China’s more eco-
nomically modern and socially fractious prefectures. While
we believe we have controlled for the prime suspects in this
study—variation in state capacity, prevalence of internet ac-
cess, and provincial confounders—future work may investi-
gate each claim using designs that offer stronger identiﬁcation
strategies.
Another limitation is our focus on citizen appeals for
information. The ﬁeld audit measures variation in gov-
ernment responsiveness to citizen requests for information01.008.245 on June 05, 2017 16:03:25 PM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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light on the extent to which this institution offers more
substantive forms of constituency service, such as providing
access to public services, addressing complaints about pub-
lic goods, or even changing public policy. Future research
may make use of publicly available citizen appeals to explore
the possible link between public participation surrounding
policy problems and local policy change in China.
By emphasizing the role of economic modernization in
authoritarian state-society relations, this study revises a re-
cent emphasis in political science on collective action pre-
vention as the core consideration in nondemocratic political
economy. While our results acknowledge the importance of
social conﬂict, they also suggest that broader changes in
state-society relations associated with modernization and
urbanization alter the relationship between ofﬁcials and
the public. However, our argument also differs from the
traditional modernization hypothesis, which links economic
development to political democracy: “all the various aspects
of economic development—industrialization, urbanization,
wealth, and education are so closely interrelated as to form
one major factor which has the political correlate of de-
mocracy” (Lipset 1960, 41). In contrast to the long-running
debate on political transitions to democracy (Acemoglu et al.
2009; Przeworski 2000), we suggest that modernization
may promote political development—in this case, improved
responsiveness to citizen appeals—within nondemocratic
regimes. We see this ﬁnding as part of a growing literature
that treats the delivery of normative political goods under
nondemocracy, including government accountability (Tsai
2007), receptivity to citizen input (Meng, Pan, and Yang
2017), responsiveness (Chen et al. 2016; Distelhorst and Hou
2014; Su and Meng 2016), and political representation
(Manion 2016; Truex 2016), as open empirical questions that
merit comparative study and can inform theories of non-
democratic rule.
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